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Based on the data obtained during a field survey in June 2015, the article focuses on a number of 
socio-political problems the city of Sevastopol faced after its accession to the Russian Federation. The 
author provides examples of the difficulties that arose in the process of Sevastopol citizens’ adaptation 
to a new institutional environment. These are the problems of split in managerial elite, party system 
instability, local self-government disruption, rejection of a set of educational innovations by the 
pedagogical community, entrepreneurs’ discontent, etc. At the same time the article shows that a key 
feature of Sevastopol was not affected in the course of adaptation, the feature being a strong corporate 
spirit and values resulting from pride for the city’s heroic history. Thus, reunification of Sevastopol 
with Russia led to significant institutional changes, which caused some socio-economic difficulties, but 
all these transformations did not affect the value system of Sevastopol, and they even strengthened it in 
fact. So, there is every reason to believe that adaptation difficulties will be overcome, and, the policy 
being reasonable, further development of Sevastopol can be quite successful.
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The Republic of Crimea and the federal 
city of Sevastopol, new subjects of the Russian 
Federation, have been in the focus of attention 
since March 2014. At first, when the media 
space faced the clash between the euphoria 
of the “Russian spring”, on the one hand, 
and a hysterical propaganda of the Ukrainian 
and European media, on the other hand, the 
abundance of unverified information, rumors, 
propaganda piping made it extremely difficult to 
analyze the events in these regions. Today, after 
the media noise has died down, and the events in 
Syria being more urgent, the issue of Crimea is 
overshadowed on the global agenda. This made 
– 987 –
Kirill V. Podyachev. The City of Sevastopol as Part of Russia: Problems of Adaptation and Possibilities of Socio-Political...
such analysis possible. Its urgency is primarily 
due to the significance the events in Crimea and 
Sevastopol have for modern Russia. Successful 
development of these regions may be important 
for successful international policy of Russia 
and, first of all, for integration processes on the 
post-Soviet space. The slightest setbacks there 
(especially the citizens’ mass discontent) will 
be fully used by geopolitical enemies to weaken 
our country. The objective of social sciences is 
to study the main problems these regions face 
and analyze the possibilities of their non-violent, 
evolutionary settlement.
What should be taken into consideration is 
extremely poor knowledge of these regions. As 
for the ideas of what is happening there, that are 
broadcast through the media and blogosphere, 
they are mutually contradictory. Therefore they 
cannot be the basis for a truly scientific analysis 
of the situation. Only direct on-site work and field 
researches combining qualitative methods with 
the principles of the “third sociology” (Shtompka, 
2009) and the elements of the intuitive knowledge 
could provide better understanding of the situation. 
It should be mentioned that the material presented 
is primarily based on the interviews1*** with the 
power, education and culture officials and some 
randomly selected residents of Sevastopol. Thus, 
only the facts and issues noted by the respondents 
will be analyzed below whereas the information 
obtained from other sources is not taken into 
consideration in the article.
No matter what foreign politicians and media 
claim, Sevastopol became a part of Russia not just 
willingly, but with joy and enthusiasm. However, 
after the euphoria of the “Russian spring” was 
over, there revealed the problems no one in 
Sevastopol or Russia previously thought about, 
the reason being neither low professionalism nor 
short views. The matter is that no one could expect 
that the city would become a part of the Russian 
Federation in the foreseeable future. Therefore, the 
need to adapt to a new institutional environment 
led to the complexities. Such adaptation, as far as 
one can judge from the examples from history, 
never runs smoothly and painlessly. Even the 
reforms that ultimately contribute to social 
development and improvement of the citizens’ 
life result in deterioration of the situation at their 
initial stage. They can also cause the resistance 
of those social groups who have to bear the main 
costs (Przeworski, 1991). Thus, Sevastopol also 
faced considerable difficulties.
The first one, which is probably the most 
painful, is the city budget revenue contraction. 
Previously its main part was accumulated in the 
city, the revenue being the payment of Russia for 
renting the Black Sea fleet base. The Ukrainian 
authorities, investing extremely little money 
in Crimea, did not dare to encroach on the 
revenue for fear of separatism explosion. After 
the accession of Crimea and Sevastopol to the 
Russian Federation Kharkov agreements were 
denounced, rent payment was terminated, and 
the city budget lost the main source of financial 
income at once. Although resources of Russia 
are significantly greater than those in Ukraine 
and the federal government started investing in 
Sevastopol, the overall level of income has not 
reached its former level so far. As a result it is 
necessary to save on everything even though 
the city needs substantial investments as its 
infrastructure got extremely worn out over the 
years the Ukrainian government and is in need of 
extensive repair works.
Basing on separatism and not trusting the 
locals, the Ukrainian authorities tried to appoint 
immigrants from the “mainland”, especially 
from Western regions, to the positions in 
Sevastopol. These people did not feel their unity 
with the citizens of Sevastopol and the citizens 
of Sevastopol themselves were regarded as 
foreigners. As a result, the psychology of the 
city top officials turned into that of colonial 
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administration, “timeservers” dreaming only 
of showing their best in front of Kiev to get a 
higher position “at home”. Therefore, on the 
one hand, they were not concerned about the 
citizens’ interests and the city development. 
At the same time they greatly feared large-
scale street protests since the very fact of their 
occurrence could undermine their reputation in 
the eyes of the Kiev leaders. It is very similar to 
the situation we observed in a number of Russian 
regions (Podyachev, 2012) though it is strongly 
reinforced. None of the authorities thought of the 
city development under such conditions as they 
mostly thought of preventing mass expression of 
discontent.
At the same time a specific model of 
“parallel” existence with the power authorities 
was formed in the civil society. The society 
tried to solve the problems the authorities did 
not solve, thus showing an example of a truly 
activist attitude towards the reality. For example, 
people would gather and have subbotniks 
(community work days) to clean dirty streets, 
they would collect money and plaster the facades 
that had peeled off without repair works, etc. 
They tried to do without the authorities in all 
possible situations. In the situations when it was 
impossible or when the authorities interfered 
in their lives, that was quite often, they came 
out into the streets with the demand to take the 
citizens’ interests into account. This pattern of 
behavior is opposite to paternalism which is very 
often ascribed to the Russian people. However, 
we do not see any classic alienation here when the 
people’s distrust of the authorities turns into civil 
passivity. At that this socially active community 
was minimally institutionalized. It was really 
dangerous to establish any really existing social 
organizations because the authorities, fearing 
pro-Russian moods, could exert pressure on 
them. Therefore, civil society did not form classic 
NGOs; they established informal communities of 
the activists united by horizontal network ties 
(exactly according to M. Castells). They mostly 
communicated not via the Internet but via more 
traditional methods, the latter being phone calls 
and even notes delivered by the boys running 
from apartment to apartment the way it was 
done in the XIX century. Institutional sociology 
failed to identify such communities. That is why 
one gains the impression that there was no civil 
society there.
A kind of civilian elite was formed there for 
more than 20 years of existence of this original 
social-political model in Sevastopol. It became 
the main driving force of the “Russian spring”. 
Many of its representatives got their positions in 
administration after Sevastopol became a part of 
the Russian Federation.
This caused a significant problem: the 
Sevastopol civil elite were inexperienced in 
civil service. They could brilliantly work in an 
informal environment, but once they turned out 
to be in the world of bureaucracy it was a very 
difficult situation for them. As for the lower 
government bodies, especially “power” ones, 
they remained the same. It was impossible to 
replace all government servants due to the lack of 
appropriately qualified personnel. This resulted 
in situations when the head, a former activist, 
supervised those who used to write denunciations 
to Security Service of Ukraine or were even 
directly involved in his arrests.
What is worse, Russia sent a considerable 
number of its officials “to strengthen” the situation, 
the latter being unfamiliar with local specifics 
but generally of high opinion of themselves. 
They considered Crimea and Sevastopol to be 
“backward” regions that needed to be “pulled up” 
to the level of “great” Russia. However, whereas 
the standard of living and economic development 
might prove this (which was not the fault of the 
locals as the investments of Ukraine into Crimea 
and Sevastopol were minimal from 1991), the 
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situation concerning culture and civil society 
self-organization was different. The citizens 
of Sevastopol were very annoyed by these 
officials’ references to the U.S. and the EU best 
practices: “What did we flee from Ukraine from? 
We fled from “Euromaidan” to have no Western 
order here. But what do they suggest us now?!” 
Therefore, the officials’ reform attempts are 
rejected by their colleagues among civil activists 
and the vast majority of the population.
Thus, the social group of Sevastopol civil 
servants-managers was divided into three 
subgroups: the “old” ones who worked with 
the Ukrainian authorities, the “new” ones who 
were civil activists and the officials sent by 
the federal authorities, each subgroup being 
subdivided further. For example, there were 
the so-called “professional revolutionaries” and 
“Chalyi’s people” among the “new” leaders. 
The former were organizers of public acts and 
active fighters against Ukrainization, the latter 
were representatives of intelligentsia who have 
always had Pro-Russian position but have never 
participated in civil movement. Of course, this 
internal split of Sevastopol managerial elite does 
not contribute to reducing costs of legal and social 
adaptation.
The problem in the party system was quite 
similar. Although Russian political parties 
rushed to Sevastopol (as well as to Crimea) after 
it became a part of Russia, only those parties 
who could rely on party structures that survived 
through the Ukrainian times, i.e. Edinaia Rossiia 
(United Russia) and the CPRF, could secure their 
position there. Such parties like Iabloko (Apple) 
or Parnassus were not taken any notice of at all. 
Their position on the accession of Crimea was 
not welcome, and they were supported only by 
a circle of fans of the so-called “contemporary 
art”.
There were only two active forces in 
Sevastopol even in Ukrainian times: the Party 
of regions and the Communist party. No other 
parties like Our Ukraine, the Tymoshenko Bloc 
or the Radical party (O. Lyashko) have ever had 
support there. Their branches in the city did not 
exist de facto. But as for the openly Pro-Russian 
Progressive socialist party (N. Vitrenko), it 
received sufficient support in Sevastopol, its 
results in the Ukrainian election campaign 
remaining within the statistical error.
After the reunification with the Russian 
Federation the local branch of the Ukrainian 
Communist party with its entire organizational 
structure fully moved into the Communist party 
of the Russian Federation with a tacit approval of 
the party leaders in Kiev.
The local branch of United Russia was 
originally formed from civil activists. However, 
some time later the former members of the Party 
of regions, who joined United Russia, carried 
out a decision to expand the Political Council of 
United Russia and, as a result, intercepted the 
party leadership.
This situation poses a threat of internal 
conflict that is a serious challenge for the party. 
It should be assumed that the administrative 
resource of United Russia in Sevastopol will 
not be of some help as its citizens are used to 
the resistance to the pressure of the authorities, 
thus, any attempts to use this resource is more 
likely to repel the voters. It can be assumed that 
in the future Sevastopol elections can bring a lot 
of surprises.
The reform of local self-government initiated 
by the official “outsiders” provokes Sevastopol 
citizens’ numerous questions. According to the 
respondents, for all the shortcomings of Ukraine, 
the Ukrainian municipal law was much more 
convenient and adequate to local realities than 
the Russian law. Moreover, when part of Ukraine, 
Sevastopol had a special status. In Russia it 
became a city of federal importance, the status 
Moscow and St. Petersburg have. As the Russian 
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officials were inexperienced in the organization 
of the cities of federal importance, the Moscow 
scheme of local self-government organization 
was introduced in Sevastopol. According to this 
scheme municipalities have no great powers, and 
the city’s economy is under the control of the city 
government. The Moscow scheme did not take 
into account the specific features of Sevastopol, 
both social and geographical (the city is indented 
with bays with no bridges across them that makes 
transportation between different parts of the city 
difficult), and this caused problems. At the time 
of our field research the system of the city’s local 
self-government had not started functioning to 
its full capacity, not all municipalities had even 
managed to adopt the rules. In the result the 
municipalities were withdrawn their powers. 
Their funding was respectively cut. What they 
were engaged in were only cultural and leisure 
activities in fact. To clean the streets or to bury a 
dead man it was necessary to call the employees 
from the center, and the latter had to go from afar. 
It definitely annoyed the citizens.
Another pressure point is education. 
However, these are not students or their 
parents but mainly teachers who show their 
dissatisfaction. There arose two problems in this 
area – administrative and ideological. The first 
one is that the headmaster’s power in Ukraine is 
almost absolute. Under the condition of ideological 
loyalty he / she is almost under no control of 
administrative authorities. As for the school 
proper, the headmaster is free in both financial 
and personnel matters. The ideological control 
was the only one exercised over the headmaster. 
It gave no way to “wrong” views questioning the 
official version of the history of Ukraine. The 
headmasters in Russia worked under different 
conditions. They no longer had unlimited access 
to finances. Neither could they fire teachers at 
their own discretion, which, of course, caused 
frustration on their part.
The ideological problem is much deeper. It is 
that despite all Ukrainian authorities’ attempts to 
implement an “ideologically correct” conception 
of history and to replace the Russian language 
by the Ukrainian language at Sevastopol 
schools the pedagogical community resisted 
with all their might, sometimes showing the 
wonders of ingenuity. They showed the same 
resistance (meeting the parents’ sympathy in 
full) to Yushchenko’s attempts to promote such 
“European values” as “sex education”, “rights 
of the child”, etc. in schools. According to the 
respondents, it was very surprising when after 
Sevastopol had joined the Russian Federation 
these attempts were resumed by “people from 
Moscow and St. Petersburg” (!). This definitely 
caused serious discontent.
Whereas the solution of the administrative 
problem implies that the government can rely 
on pedagogical professional community, not 
interested in preserving the headmasters’ absolute 
power, the solution of the problem of content 
necessarily requires a dialogue between teachers 
and parents as only a dialogue makes it possible 
to avoid conflict.
However, adaptation processes were most 
painful for the business community, small 
business in particular. The entrepreneurs face 
great difficulties, the main one being sanctions 
or, rather, inability to be properly credited and 
insured caused by them. The matter is that 
there was hardly a Russian Bank or insurance 
company which had enough courage to take a 
decision to work in Crimea because of their fear 
of the problems in Europe. There were also severe 
problems with logistics due to the absence of 
bridge and poor sea traffic which got even more 
aggravated due to the transport blockade initiated 
by Ukraine.
The absence of land cadastre in Sevastopol 
also causes serious difficulties as no one bothered 
to introduce it during the period of independent 
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Ukraine existence. As for the Russian land 
law, it basically proceeds from the existence of 
cadastre and, thus, fails to take the situation of 
its absence into account. This was the reason 
why the processes of plots of land allocation and 
redistribution stopped, which greatly hinders the 
development of quite a number of business areas.
Finally, the Russian system of law is more 
detailed than the Ukrainian one. According 
to its current requirement, the entrepreneurs 
themselves or their consultants should have much 
more professional legal education than they have 
had before. According to the respondents, the 
liberal opposition representatives’ statements 
that Ukraine had more freedom contain some 
truth. But the roots of “freedom” were not of a 
“democratic character”. “Freedom” resulted 
from a low degree of order, much lower level of 
administrative organization. Greater focus on 
details and order in economic activity regulation 
in Russia may be more favourable in the future 
than “half-civilized” business environment in 
Ukraine. Yet, it is so far difficult for the Sevastopol 
business community to adapt, constant control 
of various supervising bodies they have never 
experienced before being the most difficult for 
them. 
However, as far as we can judge basing 
on the collected data, the Sevastopol business 
community does not rue the Ukrainian past 
and has no intention to go back, even despite its 
members’ discontented grumbling which is the 
most common.
In conclusion, it is important to note that all 
the difficulties of adaptation mentioned above 
did not affect value orientations of the citizens of 
Sevastopol. Their local patriotism, based on the 
pride for the city’s heroic history and associated 
with the Russian fleet, revealed itself in the 
Ukrainian authorities’ times. It is no less strong 
now. The “corporate spirit” in the city is also 
very strong; the residents feel their belonging to 
Sevastopol above all and, thus, oppose themselves 
to the residents of Crimea. “Where do you see 
Crimean people here?” most of the respondents 
replied. “Crimean people are those who live 
in Yalta, whereas people here are Sevastopol 
citizens”. Yet, Sevastopol patriotism is not 
different from patriotism of the Russian people as 
Sevastopol has always positioned itself as the city 
of the Russian glory. Sevastopol identity largely 
absorbs ethnic and religious differences, uniting 
people around shared values. The core of the value 
system is common historical memory, particularly 
about the events of the Great Patriotic War. The 
memory also keeps other important historic events 
connected with the city – St. Prince Vladimir’s 
christening in Chersonese, the Russian Black Sea 
fleet’s victories, defense of Sevastopol during the 
Crimean war, etc. Solid rejection of Ukrainian 
nationalism as well as “European values” such as 
delegitimation of marriage, same-sex relations, 
cosmopolitanism, etc. is also typical for mass 
consciousness of the citizens of Sevastopol. The 
value core is stable, the communities of teachers, 
cultural workers and civil society activists (with 
their characteristics noted above) contributing to 
their preservation. Their efforts resulted in the 
protection of value system from diffusion even 
despite the efforts of the Ukrainian propaganda 
as well as in its imparting to young people.
Therefore, the majority of the Sevastopol 
citizens believe that they have achieved the right 
to be a part of Russia through much suffering. 
They have won it in their struggle. Although some 
of them feel frustrated from staying in Russia, 
adaptation problems and the consequent loss of 
wealth cause discontent especially among trade 
workers and small entrepreneurs, this discontent 
being limited to dull grumbling only. Their 
dissatisfaction with the difficulties they have 
does not affect their attitude to accession to the 
Russian Federation as the facts about their desire 
to return to Ukrainian are not revealed. Besides, 
Kirill V. Podyachev. The City of Sevastopol as Part of Russia: Problems of Adaptation and Possibilities of Socio-Political...
if the grumbling ones are more in number, it is not 
they who form the general background of public 
discourse. The civilian elite mentioned above and 
its representatives firmly believe that being part 
of Russia is worth being patient for a while. 
The participants of the meeting on the 23 of 
February 2015 who were mostly local civil activists 
agreed: “We came to Russia not to be its burden. 
The country experiences difficulties caused by 
the sanctions, the latter being undertaken for 
us. We have no right to be an anchor pulling the 
country down. We have the right to expect that our 
interests will be taken into account, but should 
not expect any privileges, leniency, etc. from the 
Russian Federation. The Russian Federation has 
already helped us to leave off the power of the 
strangers. Now we must help Russia”.
Thus, reunification of Sevastopol with 
Russia has led to significant institutional changes 
resulting in some socio-economic difficulties. 
However, all these transformations, if affecting 
the value system of Sevastopol, strengthened it 
even more.
Summing up the research issue, it is worth 
while formulating its main results:
1. Institutional transformation and adaptation 
to Russian socio-economic and legal environment 
are very difficult for Sevastopol. However, it is 
almost always so in similar cases.
2. Despite the costs of the transition period 
no one (even the entrepreneurs who were mostly 
affected during a social group transformation) 
regrets the choice made in March 2014 and 
is going to demand the return to Ukraine or 
something like that.
3. The main carriers of local patriotism as well 
as of firm Pro-Russian moods are humanitarian 
intelligentsia and the “creative class” (students, 
engineers, IT employees), – exactly those majority 
in Moscow and St. Petersburg with Pro-Western, 
capitulatory positions.
4. The role of local actors (Podyachev, 
2014) in Sevastopol is great. It is they who 
mainly kept historical memory and spiritual and 
cultural ties with Russia during the Ukrainian 
authorities’ times. They have become the 
main driving force of the “Russian spring” 
and still maintain solid network connections 
thus preserving Sevastopol civil society’s high 
mobilization potential.
5. The majority of the Sevastopol citizens 
think that reunification with Russia has been 
achieved through much suffering, and they have 
nowhere to go from their native home. They 
regarded the Ukrainian power to be the power of 
the others. As for the Russian power, they do not 
consider it as such and are ready for cooperation. 
However, if the authorities pursue a reformist 
policy without regard to the citizens’ interests, 
the protests of causal character will not be long 
in coming. Rich experience in both passive and 
active resistance to administrative pressure, 
accumulated by the Sevastopol civic activists, 
will determine their much larger scale compared 
to the protests in other regions of the Russian 
Federation.
1 The respondents were interviewed during the period of 8-18 of June, 2015.
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Город Севастополь в составе России:  
проблемы адаптации и возможности  
социально-политического развития  
(по материалам качественного исследования)
К.В. Подъячев
Институт социологии Российской академии наук 
Россия, 117218, Москва, ул. Кржижановского, 24/35, кор. 5, каб. 502
В статье на основе данных, полученных в ходе полевых исследований в июне 2015 г., 
рассматривается ряд социально-политических проблем, возникших в городе Севастополе 
после его присоединения к Российской Федерации. Автор приводит примеры трудностей, 
возникающих в процессе адаптации севастопольского общества к новой институциональной 
среде. Рассматриваются проблемы раскола управленческой элиты, нестабильности партийной 
системы, дезорганизации местного самоуправления, неприятия педагогическим сообществом 
ряда новаций в образовании, недовольства предпринимателей и т.п. Одновременно в статье 
показано, что ключевая особенность Севастополя – сильный корпоративный дух и ценностное 
ядро, основанное на гордости героической историей города, – не пострадала в ходе адаптации. 
Таким образом, можно видеть, что хотя воссоединение города Севастополя с Россией и привело 
к существенным институциональным преобразованиям, вызвавшим определённые трудности 
социально-экономического характера, все эти трансформации если и сказались на системе 
ценностей севастопольцев, то только в сторону ещё большего её укрепления. Поэтому есть 
все основания полагать, что адаптационные трудности будут преодолены и при разумной 
политике дальнейшее развитие города Севастополя может быть весьма успешным.
Ключевые слова: политология, социология, Севастополь, «русская весна», гражданское 
общество, адаптация, социальное развитие, интеграция, активизм, ценностная система.
Научная специальность: 22.00.00 – социологические науки.
